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The biological basis of intertemporal choice and the 
design of debiasing institutions 
 





We will argue that psychology and neuroscience not only 
provide a better understanding of why choices may be 
intertemporally inconsistent, but also give insights in the way 
institutional design and policies-making may reduce the negative 
aggregate impact of this widespread behavioral anomaly. We will first 
describe this anomaly and whether it can, along with other 
documented behavioral anomalies, have an impact at the aggregate 
level. It is not necessarily the case that all individual behavioral or 
cognitive biases add up to a collective effect. In particular they may 
be eliminated through markets interactions or mechanisms. Our 
question is whether it is putatively the case with hyperbolic 
discounting, i.e. the typical functional form that describes our 
discounting future utilities in making intertemporal choices, leading 
to inconsistent preference reversals. More generally we can consider 
that institutions, which typically solve inter-individual difficulties, 
may also help solve internal conflicts, as the ones which stem from 
lack of self control, hyperbolic discounting and the ensuing 
substitution of short-term detrimental behavior to long-run beneficial 
plans. In the second section we will link up with normative 
discussions about so-called “soft paternalism” (Camerer 2003; Thaler 
and Sunstein 2003), which can be defined as the design of 
institutional contexts inducing better choices by individuals without 
infringing on their autonomy. We will defend a version of soft 
paternalism. Inconsistent intertemporal preferences raise a thorny 
issue for soft paternalism, if we consider that those behavioral 
patterns may have evolved in humans (as well as in other animals) 
because they were advantageous on the whole. Is there, in 
consequence, a possible optimal institutional design to eliminate 
hyperbolic discounting, given that, on the one hand, individuals may 
fail to acknowledge the sub-optimality of their behavior, and, on the 
other hand, that the paternalistic interventionist may ignore local 
circumstances justifying a preference for the present over the future. 
In the third section we wonder whether social neuroscience studies 
of intertemporal choice may clarify those issues. We indicate the 
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neural mechanisms that underlie intertemporal choice. Humans are 
unique in the sense that their brains implement two competing 
systems: one yielding to impulses in the very short run, and one that 
discounts the future in a regular way, lending credibility to a quasi-
hyperbolic model as the one proposed by Laibson (1997). The 
problem, though, is with conflicts between present and future 
maximization of self-utility: the dualistic neural account, in itself, 
does not provide a solution for preferring one perspective (present or 
future) over the other. It is left to the paternalist to define what 
temporal perspectives vis-à-vis individual behavior is the normatively 
encompassing one. By doing so, he may be led to deserve the 
“softness” qualification to a lesser extent. 
 
2. Within-individual biases and institutional design 
 
Intertemporal choices are decisions with consequences that 
occur or spread at different moments of time. Those decisions of 
course cover all aspects of life: health, food, occupation, leisure, etc. 
The idea of intertemporal choices is that they imply trade-offs 
between present gratifications and later ones. Economists have 
modeled those life situations initially and prevalently using the 
discounted utility model proposed by Samuelson (1937). In that 
model, individuals evaluate the benefits and losses that may result 
from a decision in an exponential way: the utility of consequences is 
continuously discounted at a constant rate. This model has been 
used as a tool for public policy. The discount rate used to analyze a 
given trade-off will guide the policy. Psychological research (e.g. 
Ainslie 1975) has challenged this initial model by showing that 
humans tended to discount time in a hyperbolic way rather than an 
exponential one. Exponential discounting cannot account for the 
frequently observed inconsistency of preferences across time nor 
make sense of the frailty of human plans, projects, and resolutions. 
There has been opposed contentions among behavioral and 
experimental economists as to know whether documented biases and 
anomalies, when observed at the individual level, had any 
significance at the aggregate level, which is the one macroeconomists 
and policy-makers are interested in. This issue was lying at the core 
of a debate between Kahneman and Smith in the early 1990s. To 
schematize its terms the opposition was between experimental 
economists insisting that monetary incentives and immersion on 
markets tend to eliminate errors, anomalies or biases (Harrison 
1992; Smith and Walker 1993) and psychologists who downplay the 
evidence that such incentives suffice to extirpate biases (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992). The latter concede that remuneration eliminates 
some errors but the debate is precisely about why some errors can 
possibly resist market situations. Smith suggests a general answer. If 
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decision costs are high but rewards are potentially low, it is in the 
subject’s interest not to be too accurate in his decision. Now, 
decreasing opportunity costs and increasing rewards, according to 
Smith’s experimental evidence, tend to eliminate errors. In an 
influential recent paper Edward Glaeser (2004) synthesizes the point 
by contending that if people have the ability to correct their errors, 
they will spend more to correct these errors when the cost of these 
errors in higher. Reciprocally this means that errors would be 
particularly prevalent in situations where the cost of the poor 
assessment of one’s cognitive status is low. The elimination of 
hyperbolic discounting anomalies along Smith and Glaeser’s 
proposal would amount to make normative decisions less costly. But 
in what monetary sense is overcoming choices leading to bad future 
consequences costly? It is hard to define a decision opportunity cost 
for many biases and anomalies that have been documented. 
Moreover this policy would be ineffective with naïve hyperbolic 
discounters who may fail to understand that they will be subject to 
biases in the future and may think that they won’t have to incur the 
cost of wrong choices2. 
It is hard to give a principled answer to the question as to 
which anomalies have presumably an impact at an aggregate level. 
As we recalled above, in the case of intertemporal choice anomalies, 
aggregated individual anomalous patterns of behavior presumably 
entail collective inefficiency, in connection with issues such as 
savings (Thaler and Benartzi 2004) or education and development 
(Mullainathan 2005). Institutions reduce externalities, help solve 
asymmetry of information and coordination problems, and in general 
have been deemed by economists to implement social norms when, 
in a more parsimonious economic ontology, social norms have not 
simply been identified with institutions. To some extent institutions 
are coextensive with aspects and patterns of interpersonal behavior. 
“Market” for instance is an institution which can receive as an 
extensional definition the sum of trading activities run by individuals 
in a given geographical and historical context. More specific 
institutions grafted on free markets may diversely determine trading 
activities, other activities than trade may be regulated as an effect of 
institutional manipulation, and emerging norms may simply be 
denominated in terms of that intentional institutional device. 
What remains constant over this alternative ontology of 
institutions (the intended design vs. or as the patterns of behavior 
correlative to that effective design), is that relations between 
individuals, rather than phenomena taking place within individuals, 
appear to constitute the basic unit of institutional epistemology and 
practice. As Mullainathan aptly put it: “this focus on resolving 
                                            
2 The authors are indebted to Milo Bianchi for this particular argument. 
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problems between people, rather than within individuals, is natural 
to economists” (Mullainathan 2005). This raises the same issue as 
before: psychological errors have in principle little importance as long 
as they do not transpose into a collective problem and as long as 
they can be solved through repetitive interactions in a market or 
through the application of more specific institutional mechanisms. 
This position shapes a prejudiced view of what ingredients of human 
psychology are worth being taken into account by economists as 
targets of deliberate public policies. The prejudice may come in 
several guises. Most often economists have been accused of 
entertaining an unrealistic view of individuals’ cognitive abilities, 
selfish motivations, and unflinching desires and will. But it does not 
suffice to invert the terms of this prejudice, as it has also too often 
been proposed that by postulating a bounded cognition and 
willpower and ingrained altruistic motives we automatically get a 
more faithful view of the psychology underlying economic behavior. 
The picture may be more mitigated. Imagine a mother whose 
perfectly lucid goals consist in favoring her child’s education through 
schooling in a developing country. She has been saving money for 
many years in order to fulfill that goal. She has reasonable, not too 
low, nor too high, expectations of how schooling will improve her 
child’s living conditions, and maybe hers in the future. She is then 
altruistic within the limits of an extended selfishness. Her willpower 
also is maximally exerted. She has resisted so far a gamut of 
temptations and actual needs to spend the spared money for 
pressing urges. Why postulate bounded cognition and willpower in 
her case? This is certainly not the most salient explanatory factor in 
the context at hand that will make sense of that mother’s eventual 
failure to grant her child a durable education. Environmental factors 
that led the mother to spend her savings for even more pressing 
urges (like paying her husband expansive medical care) might have 
made her divest from her primary goal in spite of mental lucidity and 
relative firmness. These are the types of cases envisioned in 
Mullainathan’s prospective article on how development economics 
may benefit from psychological and behavioral approaches (2005). 
The fact is simply that in some cases agents stray away from their 
self-declared goals not by lack of the adequate cognitive abilities but 
lack of possibilities to exert them fully. The mothers had to change 
her initial plans due to an adverse shock and by doing so she does 
not infringe any principle of rationality. She could have stuck to her 
initial plans had the budget for the education of her son be engaged 
in a different way. 
But why not consider temptations, sudden lack of willpower, 
hyperbolic discounting, as sorts of adverse internal shocks? 
Hyperbolic discounters change their plans while no new information 
has arrived or a shock occurred. Even if, contrary to Mullanaithan’s 
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“mother”, those individuals have exemplifying typical bounded 
rationality or willpower, why not treat their weakness and errors on a 
par with within-individuals conflicts or failures which are not due to 
any cognitive boundedness and can, presumably, be targeted by 
appropriate institutional settings. The hypothesis here is that similar 
contextual changes can address internal conflicts due to a lucid and 
rational or to an impulsive and irrational move from the individual. 
Mullainathan (2005) makes institutional suggestions that seem to us 
to apply to both types of cases: spread the pressure of a costly 
decision (investment) over time so that it becomes harder to forego 
one’s original plans once the, usually punctual, decision has been 
made; multiply the occasion of rendering a final outcome of a long-
term beneficial solution salient, as saliency of those outcomes may 
motivate individuals to pursue them; distill benefits of decisions in 
advance so that those benefits stop to be fully unattained objectives. 
But there may also be systematic bounds on cognition, will and 
motives, whose effects may be pervasive in a community and the 
more specific question is, with respect to those actual bounds, to 
know whether there are some adequate settings to limit their 
suboptimal impact. In Smithian terms, the type of solutions just 
suggested, should eliminate self-control problems as it decreases the 
opportunity cost of implementing a long-term beneficial solution and 
makes the reward more salient and more immediate, if not higher. If 
so, there is no further practical question to raise about systematic 
biases than about circumstantial hurdles to realize one’s will as both 
types of errors are treated in the same institutional way. But we may 
doubt that self-control problems can be as conveniently disposed of, 
for the main reason that they may have a biological reality (and 
evolutionary justification) which makes them less tractable than 
more superficial errors. 
Answers to this question may contribute a better 
understanding of the purpose and potential efficiency of proactive 
institutional designing in addressing within-individuals, rather than 
between-people, issues. Our more specific purpose in the following is 
to assess how neural data, especially those providing a 
neurobiological understanding of intertemporal choice behavioral 
anomalies, may help provide those answers. But we must first recall 
recent twists in the debate about paternalism, the position which 
consists in favoring people’s self-interest and capacities in spite of 
their apparent lack of will or ability to act accordingly. There are 
several conceptions about which way of practicing benevolence is the 
least intrusive and the most efficient. Intertemporal choice seems the 
staple example of controversies about kinds of paternalisms as it 
blatantly encapsulates a potential conflict between short-term and 
long terms interests. Moreover, anomalies affecting intertemporal 
choice show that people have inconsistent preferences or, at least, 
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mutually inconsistent compartmentalized temporal windows with 
regard to the expression of their preferences, which makes those 
anomalies a privileged hard case for the institutional dealing with 
within-individual problems. 
 
3. Variations of soft paternalism and their difficulties 
 
Soft paternalism suggests that institutional designs are 
possible which can help individuals make the most rational choices 
for themselves without infringing on their autonomy (Camerer 2003; 
Thaler and Sunstein 2003). Such institutional designs would be 
benign for rational people and therapeutic for those who succumb to 
allegedly nefarious anomalies such as hyperbolic discounting, 
namely the propensity to make impulsive choices and entertain an 
imperfect or insufficiently compelling representation of their future 
interests. 
Shaping public policies may legitimately follow the twin goals 
of preserving individual freedom and maximizing collective efficiency. 
But it should not impose a particular normative vision of their future 
on individuals and only reasonably enhance their capability to stick 
to their resolutions. The difficulty is the following: the preference for 
the present may well be a behavioral law, anchored in evolutionary 
motives, and, as such, optimal on the whole, which it may be vain, 
and irrational at a meta-level, to thwart. Only the most pathological 
cases leading to severe instances of social dysfunction should be 
dealt with, in a way, though, that may lead us astray from soft guises 
of paternalism. 
In order for paternalism to be a legitimate policy it thus has to 
encompass a normative standpoint, even though it does not seek to 
impose it on individuals. A paradox may loom at this juncture and 
threaten the coherence of paternalism. In absence of such a 
normative standpoint, paternalist policies lose their gist and 
legitimacy. Now, let’s suppose that there is enough theoretical and 
empirical ground for paternalists to define normative behavioral 
standards; two attitudes may ensue. Strong soft paternalism, so to 
say, may see to it that individuals adhere to these normative 
standards, so that they would gain cognitive autonomy. Weak soft 
paternalism may more modestly look for punctual error corrections 
without intending deeper mental reform on the part of individuals. 
Where paradox looms is that the most ambitious form of paternalism 
may rely, in order to achieve its goal of fostering cognitive autonomy, 
on not so soft settings, while weaker approaches may keep soft all 
the way long but become permanent. In both cases a risk of slippery 
slope toward institutional hardening or encrusting arises, one which 
had not been clearly identified in similar critiques that have been 
addressed to soft paternalism. But even more fundamentally, it is not 
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so clear that one can easily agree on a normative standpoint in the 
face of intertemporal choice anomalous behavior. 
A reasonable assumption would be to adopt a normative 
standpoint with which the agent would himself tend to agree. But 
this agreement often comes too late, when the harm is done, and it 
may then essentially consist of regrets. As Paserman (2004) states: 
“with hyperbolic preferences, a long unemployment spell could be 
due to 'bad' choice; with the agent agreeing that his own choices are 
undesirable from a long-run perspective. Therefore, an intervention 
that brings the agent to choose actions that are in line with his long-
run preferences may actually be welfare improving”. It may be far 
from easy to make the agents anticipate long-term consequences of 
his actions in absence of actually felt regrets of having performed 
them. But if their performance is necessary for feeling those regrets, 
the point of a paternalistic guidance becomes empty and agents 
would be on the whole better off by being left alone. 
The psychological impact of paternalistic intervention all 
depends, in fact, on the import of viscerally felt consequences by 
contrast with purely anticipated ones. If one can agree on a long-
term goal on purely rational basis, stick to that basis and overcome 
temptations when they present themselves, it is fine enough with the 
social cost of providing such information. But it is not so clear that 
an agent, even in a cold state of rational deliberation based on 
explicit information about future alternatives, would choose a life 
path deliberately deprived of irrationalities and “hot states”. This is a 
question that holders of paternalism of all brands should address: 
how can we know in advance that we won’t value less a life whose 
apparent higher quality has been externally determined than a less 
qualitative self-determined one? Of course soft paternalism does not 
bind individuals but modifies the contexts in which choices are made 
so that long-term beneficial ones normally self-impose. But the 
deprivation of bad choices may also have a cost – for example that of 
impeding individuals of having overcome them by themselves – and it 
would be a simple experiment to run, in the vein of those prized by 
behavioral economists who inspire new paternalism, to measure 
hedonistic states associated with repeated choices in two contrasted 
situations: one in which a “good” choice is made among other good 
choices, and one in which it is made among choices of a more mixed 
nature, some of them presenting short-term satisfaction and long-
term regrets. 
Another example, by Gruber and Mullainathan (2002), 
suggest that smokers with hyperbolic discount rate would like to 
smoke less, but cannot. So taxes could help people deal with their 
self-control problem having a positive impact on the present 
discounted value of happiness. The condition of normative agreement 
is in principle fulfilled in that case. In order for policy makers to 
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discuss the time preferences 'problem' at least two topics should be 
explored: are individuals aware of their preferences inconsistency? 
And if so, would one agree that one’s own choices are undesirable 
from a long-run perspective? Second, should policy makers give 
priority to the long-run time preferences, at the expenses of her 
immediate tastes, modifying the present individual’s choices to make 
them time consistent? 
One should indeed reflect on the potential value of short 
horizon choices, and how preference for the present may have 
evolved under certain environmental constraints; the question being, 
as we will make more precise below, to know to what extent these 
behavioral patterns may still continue to provide potentially apt 
responses to features of current social economic environments. 
Another fundamental, and theoretically deeper, difficulty for 
paternalism may stem from models of poor self-control and addiction 
that account for the rationality of those behaviors. Becker and 
Murphy (1988) have presented the standard rational addiction 
model. This model excludes within-individual irrationality (and 
consequently any form of paternalistic policy that makes its aim to 
target such form of irrationality) and predicts that consumption will 
depend on prices of addictive goods and governmental regulation of 
those goods should only depend on interpersonal externalities. 
Gruber and Köszegi (2001) have tested these predictions, and while 
they are empirically confirmed, these authors also note that another 
formulation of the Becker-Murphy model would accommodate the 
facts as well. Namely, if one incorporates – in conformity with an 
intuitive and plausible account of deficient self-control and addiction 
phenomena – inconsistent preferences in the model, this enriched 
model continues to yield the standard predictions of prices/taxes 
sensitivity of addictive goods consumption, and, although less 
parsimonious, it possesses a finer intuitive flavor. Gruber and 
Köszegi’s position is then, in an expected way, to draw normative 
implications which support paternalism, i.e. the designing of 
institutional devices that would specifically target “internalities”, 
rather than externalities, imposed by addictive agents on themselves. 
They thus recommend a one dollar surplus tax over the one 
calculated through Becker-Murphy estimates – the social price so to 
say of aggregated internal inconsistencies. 
Once again, predictive power may not be sufficient to grant 
behavioral models supporting paternalism firm enough theoretical 
ground to favor long-run preferences as a normative anchor. It is 
clear that blatantly inconsistent preferences create a difficulty for 
rational choice theory, but incorporating them (behavioral 
economists’ fetish verb) says in itself nothing about which of 
mutually inconsistent preferences provides the correct normative 
standpoint. This choice is in fact a principled one, one with which it 
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may be generally the case agents agree, but not fully motivated by 
internal reasons. To be more precise, there are two possible levels of 
indeterminacy that make more complicated than usually thought the 
selection of a normative standpoint when facing time inconsistent 
preferences. The first indeterminacy relates to the numbering of 
discount rates in accounting for intertemporal choice. How many 
values of discount can there be? There may be so many, or none in 
particular, that one can doubt the existence of a tractable functional 
account of intertemporal choice, shedding doubts on the historical 
process of finding a seemingly adequate functional account of time-
inconsistency. In second, even if functional legibility can be attained 
and his time-preferences well identified by the agent, will he 
necessarily acknowledge, even in retrospect, the normative 
compelling nature of the most regular (typically the one reflecting 
more patience) functional form? Let’s address in turn those two 
difficulties.  
Behavioral economists have tended to encompass 
intertemporal choice and its anomalies within a unifying functional 
approach. The idea that the value of a good depends on the timing of 
its consumption was already present in the economic thought of the 
18th century but discussed in more details by who is in consequence 
considered the father of intertemporal choice modeling: John Rae 
(1834, 1905). According to Rae, someone’s time preferences are 
explained by his "effective desire of accumulation". In 1884, Eugen 
von Böhm-Bawerk (1890) claimed that this systematic tendency to 
underestimate future pleasures may be due to humans lacking the 
capacity to make a complete picture of their future wants, especially 
when it comes to remotely distant ones. Fisher (1930) – who 
announced the basic economic relations in intertemporal choice - 
continued this approach suggesting that every person has his own 
rate of ‘impatience’, one that depends upon objective factors (size and 
risk of future income) and subjective factors (foresight, strength of 
will, habit, uncertainty, selfishness, influence of fashion). Paul 
Samuelson (Samuelson 1937) was the first economist who suggested 
the discounted-utility (DU) model, a mathematical function 
describing time preferences in general assuming that "the individual 
behaves so as to maximize the sum of all future utilities". 
Many economic decisions involve outcomes that occur at 
different points in time. To model such decisions, discounted utility 
models are typically used. These models combine a utility function 
that reflects attitudes towards outcomes and a discount function 
that captures the effect of the passage of time. The most widely used 
discounted utility model in economics is constant discounting in 
which the discount function is determined by a constant rate of 
discount. However, much empirical research has underlined “various 
inadequacies of the DU model as a descriptive model of behavior” a 
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phenomenon referred to as decreasing impatience (Frederick et al., 
2002, Read 2004). One of the major anomalies is that discount rates 
appear not to be invariant over different horizons. Indeed, as already 
noted by Strotz (1956), agents appear to discount the future relative 
to the present more rapidly than they discount between different 
dates in the future. According to this hypothesis, “people are 
impatient at present, but claim to be patient in the future.” (Nir, 
2004). 
These findings have led to the development of alternative 
discounted utility models, commonly referred to as hyperbolic 
discounting. The hyperbolic discounting models are consistent with 
decreasing impatience and have become quickly popular in 
economics. Today many applications are based on hyperbolic 
discounting, in particular on quasi-hyperbolic discounting: a model 
that was first proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and made 
popular by Laibson (1997). In his work Laibson (1997) suggested a 
discrete time discount “quasi-hyperbolic” function which captures 
the key property of hyperbolic discounting in a more tractable 
functional form: preferences at time t are inconsistent with 
preferences at time, implying a gap between one’s long-run goals and 
short-run behavior. This gap may elicit some type of behavior that 
should be invested by policy makers (for example, retirement issues 
and procrastination). 
But doubts have been raised on the existence of a regular 
functional form. Rubinstein (2003) has forcefully made the point that 
the same experimental evidence that refutes constant utility 
discounting undermines hyperbolic discounting in the same manner. 
Rubinstein emphasizes a basic indeterminacy in the choice of a 
functional form to account for our intertemporal choice behavior 
when we inductively try to build this functional form on empirical 
evidence, be it behavioral or psychological. For a behavioral 
economist to “incorporate” psychological underpinnings of manifest 
discounting behavior in his theory and make them fit with a given 
functional form it is necessary to understand how individuals 
mentally apprehend trade-offs between immediate and future larger 
rewards. There is no reason to find functional regularity in the way 
those mental trade-offs proceed. What Rubinstein sees there is the 
use of a similarity heuristics quite comparable to the one used in 
balancing rewards and their probability, and generating, in some 
cases anomalous behavior (Tversky 1977). Namely, when the 
comparison to two rewards lying at different times involve rewards 
that do not differ drastically and times that are far away from the 
other, the mental eye will focus on times rather than not very distinct 
rewards. The reverse is true too. Overall, it does not draw up a 
functional form, let alone a quasi-hyperbolic one. Rubinstein then 
opposes a procedural and a functional version of utility discounting. 
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Is the quasi-hyperbolic functional form an over-simplification 
of the phenomenon, making it too easy to choose, from an external 
viewpoint, between two obvious opposed discount rates? As we 
insisted, the paternalist hopes a legitimating coincidence between 
this external viewpoint and the agent’s debiased appraisal of his 
inconsistent preferences. The problem is that the agent may be lucid, 
invert his long term preferences in favor of a seemingly impatient and 
poorly controlled choice, and be rational in doing so. The mother in 
our initial example had those characteristics. Does what has been 
planned in the long term necessarily prevail, in terms of compelling 
normativity, over sudden decisions that contradict those plans? The 
answer is a clear “no!” The reason is simple enough and normatively 
compelling: there is an asymmetry of information, with respect to 
seemingly local impatient decisions lying in contradiction with stably 
defined plans, between the observer and the agent. The paternalist 
observer tries to find a point of agreement between the agent and 
himself about the normativity of long temporal horizons and he may 
rally the agent to his prospects. However, he may systematically lack 
insights about local and sudden inversions of the plans which may 
however depend on even more compelling reasons than those plans. 
As Daniel Read convincingly puts it: “The information available to the 
acting-agent about the local consequences of a specific choice will 
often be better than the information available to the pre-agent [the 
planning agent]. When a dieter changes his mind and has tiramisu 
after promising not to, it might be because he is weak-willed, or it 
might be because he has only now realized how appealing the 
tiramisu is”. (Read 2006). Or as Mario Rizzo and Glen Whitman sum 
up: “When the short-run benefits are closer at hand, [the agent] may 
have the benefit of superior local information” (Rizzo and Whitman 
2009). It is clear that there could not be simple ways to reach 
coincidence of viewpoints, between agent’s and observer’s, about 
correct choices given this fundamentally asymmetric access to local 
normative reasons. 
It is then of the utmost importance that policy-makers 
increase their awareness of the biological bases of behavioral 
patterns that they intend to reform; not that local reasons are 
biological ones and long term plans less dependent on a biological 
basis. The situation is more complex as short-term and long-term 
reasoning may conflict on an evolutionary basis. A first lesson that 
could be learnt from a biological understanding of the phenomenon 
is that good reasons may be spread over a variety of subjective 
temporal horizons. Even if one simplifies the account of inconsistent 
time-preferences in terms of a dual functional form, there is no 
principled reason, from a biological standpoint, to grant more 
normative power to one sector of the quasi-hyperbolic curve than to 
the other. 




4. Biological bases of intertemporal choice  
 
Is there an evolutionary justification to our intertemporal 
choice behavior and have neuroeconomics studies of utility 
discounting so far contributed to define those hypothetical 
evolutionary motives? Answers to these questions may help solve 
some of the indeterminacies of soft paternalism we expounded in the 
previous section. Although (some) animals display far-sighted 
behaviors (e.g., storing nuts for winter), these are typically 
preprogrammed and distinct from the type of spontaneous self-
control observed in humans (e.g., deciding to go on a diet) Ranger et 
al. (2008). The almost uniquely human capacity to take the delayed 
consequences of our behavior into account appears to be directly 
attributable to the prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain that was 
the most recent to expand in the evolutionary process that produced 
humans (Manuck et al., 2003), and that is also the latest part of the 
brain to develop with age. Patients with damage to prefrontal regions 
tend to behave myopically, placing little weight on the delayed 
consequences of their behavior (Damasio, et al. 1994). On the other 
hand, having developed a large prefrontal cortex did not eradicate 
short-sighted behavior supported by other more ancient parts of the 
brain. In human brains the two possibilities coexist, and may 
generate internal conflicts. We may wonder that this is the case, and 
more precisely surmise that short-sighted behavior and its neural 
persistence may be due to certain evolutionary advantages. 
Along this line Bavli (2009) argues that taking immediate 
reward may have provided an important advantage to our foraging 
ancestors, as it does for other foragers, suggesting that we have 
evolved in the first instance to act impulsively, and only more 
recently have begun to incorporate abstract reasoning into the 
equation. He concludes that nevertheless, evolutionary forces may 
have induced such a short-sighted mechanism precisely because 
snatching up immediate reward, even at the cost of sacrificing larger, 
future reward, is rule-rational (Aumann 2007) - it is a strategy that, 
in the aggregate, maximizes fitness. 
A growing body of evidence suggests that a dorsocaudal 
region of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) responds to conflicts in 
processing stimuli of any kind (Carter et al., 1998; Botvinick et al., 
2004; Yeung et al., 2004). This is consistent with findings from 
McClure et al. (2004) study in which they observed activity in a 
similar area of the ACC that was greater for decisions involving 
choices between immediate and delayed rewards than for choices 
between only delayed rewards. Such findings have been taken as 
evidence for a conflict-monitoring function of ACC, which serves to 
detect conditions requiring the recruitment of cognitive control 
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mechanisms subserved by prefrontal cortex and associated 
structures (Botvinick et al., 2001; Kerns et al., 2004). This conflict 
between short-term and long terms interests – controlled by the ACC 
– can also support Bavli hypothesis for the evolutionary process of 
intertemporal choices supported by the rule-rational approach to 
those choices (Aumann 2007). 
Yielding to immediate small rewards may be evolutionarily 
advantageous because once a small reward is consumed, it gets out 
of sight and temptation and the subject can pursue its longer-term 
goals. If gains are easy to grab, with very low opportunity costs, their 
immediate consumption may enhance the pursuit of life strategies by 
smothering tingling appetites. Our foraging ancestors may have 
developed this sense of taking advantages of small rewards as they 
presented themselves in their environments. Neural mechanisms 
dedicated to the valuation of those immediate rewards may have 
developed in order to deal properly with scarce and random 
resources. In our contemporary economic environments, this neural 
system may still prove itself useful. The pursuit of predefined long-
term goals and deflection from smaller immediate rewards may 
amount to honoring sunk costs or abstract principles in a 
counterproductive way. 
Modern economic environment are labile and complex and 
the propensity to accept small rewards may be optimal in the face of 
the opportunity costs of more sophisticated strategies. It is also 
possible that the incorporation of long-term plans and self-
projections in the far future into present decisions is more 
evolutionary recent than the tendency to accept immediate 
gratifications. From that evolutionary perspective, the preference of 
small immediate rewards over larger future ones is not the sign of 
our irrationality, but may rather reflect the conflict between two 
evolved rational rules: the incremental pursuit of long-term goals and 
the maximization of low cost immediate rewards. The conflict is 
dynamically solved if one considers, on the one hand, that aggregate 
immediate gains may add up to maximizing long-term fitness and, on 
the other hand, that predefined long-term goals are endogenously 
modified by actually made choices. 
Like humans, nonhuman animals can be run in experimental 
paradigms in which they choose between smaller earlier rewards and 
larger later rewards (although animals need to learn about the 
rewards through multiple trials, whereas humans can simply be 
informed of the contingencies). Monterosso and Ainslie (1999) note 
that “people and less cognitively sophisticated animals do not differ 
in the hyperbolic form of their discount curves.” Some researchers 
(e.g. Herrnstein 1997; Rachlin 2000) hold the view that hyperbolic 
time discounting is effectively 'hardwired' into our evolutionary 
apparatus. However, there is considerable evidence that the time 
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discounting of humans and other animals relies on qualitatively 
different mechanisms (e.g., Loewenstein 1996, Shefrin and Thaler 
1988). In support of these evidence Rangel et al. (2008) argue that 
while both humans and animals discount the future at dramatically 
different rates, both humans and animals display a common pattern 
of time discounting commonly referred to as 'hyperbolic time 
discounting'. However, they believe that while such findings do not 
rule out the possibility that humans and animals discount the future 
similarly, the quantitative discontinuity is indicative of a qualitative 
discontinuity. There is, in fact, considerable evidence that the time 
discounting of humans and other animals relies on qualitatively 
different mechanisms. Specifically, human time discounting reflects 
the operation of two fundamentally different systems, one that 
heavily values the present and cares little about the future (which we 
share with other animals), and another that discounts outcomes 
more consistently across time (which is uniquely human) (e.g., 
Loewenstein 1996, Shefrin and Thaler 1988). 
Many different neurobiological microfoundations have been 
proposed to explain the preference patterns captured by the 
hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discount functions. The most 
prominent examples include temptation models and dual-brain 
neuroeconomic models (Bernheim and Rangel, 2004; Gul and 
Pesendorfer, 2001; McClure et al., 2004; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). 
However, both the properties and mechanisms of time preferences 
remain in dispute. 
For example, using fMRI McClure et al. (2004) examined the 
brain activity of participants while they made a series of 
intertemporal choices between small proximal rewards ($R available 
at delay d) and larger delayed rewards ($R’ available at delay d’), 
where $R < $R’ and d < d’. Rewards ranged from $5 to $40 
Amazon.com gift certificates, and the delay ranged from the day of 
the experiment to six weeks later. McClure et al. (2004) found that 
time discounting is associated with the engagement of two neural 
systems: limbic and paralimbic cortical structures, are preferentially 
recruited for choices involving immediately available rewards; and 
fronto-parietal regions, which support higher cognitive functions, are 
recruited for all intertemporal choices. Moreover, the authors find 
that when choices involved an opportunity for immediate reward, 
thus engaging both systems, greater activity in fronto-parietal 
regions than in limbic regions is associated with choosing larger 
delayed rewards. A subsequent fMRI study that replaced gift 
certificates with primary rewards (juice and water) that could be 
delivered instantly in the scanner replicated this pattern (McClure et 
al. 2007). Yet another study by a different set of authors (Hariri et al. 
2006) found a similar pattern in a between- rather than within-
subject study. However, Kable and Glimcher (2007) found no 
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evidence of separable neural agents that could account for the 
multiple-selves that are used to explain hyperbolic-like discounting 
behavior. Their finding argues strongly against the hypothesis that 
multiple-selves, with different discount functions, are instantiated as 
discrete neural systems at the proximal algorithmic level contradicts 
the McClure et al., (2004) study described above that appeared to 
support the dual-self β−δ model of David Laibson (1997), at a 
neurobiological level. 
Social neuroscience should investigate the phenomenon of 
intertemporal choice in its deeper complexity. A variety of violations 
can actually be involved. Hyperbolic discounting may follow from 
distinct parameters whose labels are for instance magnitude effect, 
gain loss asymmetry, improving sequences phenomenon, common 
difference effect, etc. Those particular sources of the violations of 
rationality have not received a systematic treatment from a 
neurobiological point of view. We suggest that more than two neural 
systems are involved in hyperbolic discounting depending on the 
specific parameters that happen to contribute to discounting. This 
suggestion is along the same lines as Rubinstein (2003)’s procedural 
view of this behavioral anomaly. Once we more finely understand the 
neural mechanisms and the mental procedures involved in 
intertemporal choice institutional settings can be designed 
accordingly. 
A second suggestion relates to the way we should conceive of 
the connection between the study of neural bases of intertemporal 
choice and soft paternalist policies. What do “we” want to change in 
individuals through pinpointed institutions: their long-term goals, 
their propensity to succumb to temptations, their cognitive abilities, 
or their image of themselves and their possibility to maintain it 
across time? Let’s consider the latter possibility. Utility discounting 
has been conceptually described as an “unfair” treatment of different 
temporal stages of the self, one which could be considered as 
irrational and to some extent unethical (Ramsey 1928; Rawls 1971; 
Parfit 1984). Or, again, present utility discounting can be conceived 
of as a partial lack of continuity between the present and the future 
self. The future self is not treated on a par with the present one, 
maybe because that self is not the present one and intertemporal 
choice is better accounted for in terms of socially more or less distant 
entities entering into asymmetrical transactions (only the present self 
has some power over the future one). It is like playing a dictator 
game with oneself. Is there a neurobiological basis of this partial lack 
of interest for self-continuity? 
Ersner-Hershfield and his colleagues (2009) have shown that 
the same type of neural activation in the rostral anterior cingulated 
cortex that differentiates between self- vs. other-judgments is elicited 
in the case of judgments involving present vs. future self. Moreover, 
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the individual differences observed in terms of relative neural 
activation for present vs. future self were correlated with 
intertemporal choice behavior. The more accentuated the difference 
for activations between present vs. future self, the steeper the 
discount curve between those two temporal instances of the 
individual in an intertemporal choice task. These findings lie at the 
core of the empirical analysis of major financial decisions in 
individuals’ life, such as spending for the present or saving for the 
future. 
What neuroeconomics can teach us – or confirm – at this 
juncture is that the ability to project oneself into the future is 
correlated with the way in which we deal with intertemporal 
tradeoffs. The elaboration of our self-image, the anticipated 
continuity of our persona or psyche – whatever this entity is called – 
and the stability of mental representations of future situations in 
which we figure ourselves in apparently go against our evolutionary 
anchored proneness to yield to immediate stimuli. But there is no 
normative reason to side on one way or other of this cognitive and 
affective divide, since there is no principled reason either that myopic 
choices or apparent hyperbolic behavior be always incompatible with 
long term goals. In particular, if long term goals are internally 
present in individuals’ minds and if institutional environments 
facilitate their achievement by reducing the cost of their 
maintenance, there is no reason to think that yielding to impatient 
choices is necessarily conducive to self-destruction. It may even be 
understood as a diversification strategy, i.e. the punctual foraging of 
various gratifications which in some cases may beneficially deter the 




How neural and biological data and the confirmation they 
provide that specific neural bases for hyperbolic discounting may 
have been evolutionarily selected impact on economics? The purpose 
of the biological understanding of intertemporal choice is not simply 
to validate or invalidate alternative models of discount utility, it is, in 
our view, to connect more broadly the observed behavioral patterns 
with evolutionary motives that may explain them, with neural 
systems that were not initially thought of in connection with the 
issue of intertemporal choice, and with policies which address the 
issue in its whole complexity. A correlation between discount rates 
and a lack of interest for one’s future self, as evidenced by relevant 
neural observations, may shift the primary target of attempts to heal 
impulsivity from decreasing or increasing opportunity costs for 
intended normative decisions to developing the ability to project into 
one’s future self and decrease the perceived discontinuity between 
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the self now and tomorrow. It is an open field for new guises of 
paternalism to think of which institutional setting might foster this 
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